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THE DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM IN THE GROUP OF
NON-SINGULAR CIRCULANT MATRICES
AYAN MAHALANOBIS
ABSTRACT. The discrete logarithm problem is one of the backbones in
public key cryptography. In this paper we study the discrete logarithm
problem in the group of circulant matrices over a finite field. This gives
rise to secure and fast public key cryptosystems.
1. INTRODUCTION
Menezes and Wu [5] claim that working with the discrete logarithm prob-
lem in matrices offers no major improvement from working with a finite
field. Many authors, including myself [3], repeated that claim. It is now
a common knowledge that for practical purposes, the discrete logarithm
problem in non-singular matrices is not worth looking at.
In this note, I provide a counterexample to the above mentioned common
knowledge and show that matrices can be used effectively to produce a fast
and secure cryptosystem. This approach can be seen as working with the
MOR cryptosystem [4], with finite dimensional vector spaces over a finite
field.
In this note, we will only deal with the discrete logarithm problem in
matrices, i.e., given a non-singular d × d matrix A and B = Am over Fq,
computem; where q is a power of a prime p. One can easily build any cryp-
tosystem that uses the discrete logarithm problem, like the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange or the ElGamal cryptosystem, using the discrete logarithm
problem in matrices. There are many aspects to the security of a cryp-
tosystem. In this paper we will only deal with the computational aspects of
solving a discrete logarithm problem.
The core of the Menezes-Wu algorithm is to compute the characteristic
polynomial χA(x) ofA. The eigenvalues ofA, which are the roots of χA(x)
belong to the splitting field of χA(x). The roots of χB(x) also belong to the
same splitting field. Then to solve the discrete logarithm problem, one has
to solve the individual discrete logarithm problems in the eigenvalues and
then use the Chinese remainder theorem. The security of the discrete loga-
rithm problem depends on the degree of the extension of the splitting field.
1
Since solving a discrete logarithm problem depends on the size of the field,
we can get excellent security by taking d large (around 20) and choose A
such that χA(x) is irreducible. However, in that case matrix multiplication
becomes very expensive and we are better off working with the finite field
Fqd . This is the argument of Menezes and Wu [5].
In this paper, we deal with a particular type of non-singular matrices –
the circulant matrices. We show, that for these matrices, squaring is free
and multiplication is easy. When this is the case, the above argument is no
longer valid and we have a good chance of a successful cryptosystem. Us-
ing the extended Euclidean algorithm, computing the inverse of a circulant
matrix is easy, that makes a cryptosystem built on circulant matrices very
fast and secure.
When working with the discrete logarithm problem in matrices, one should
be careful of the fact that the determinant of a matrix is a multiplicative
function to the ground field. This can always reduce the discrete logarithm
problem in matrices to a discrete logarithm problem in the ground field.
This can be easily avoided by:
(i) Choose A such that determinant of A is 1.
2. CIRCULANT MATRICES
The reader is reminded that all fields (often denoted by F ) are finite with
characteristic p.
Definition 1. A d × d matrix over a field F is called circulant, if every
row except the first row, is a right circular shift of the row above that. So a
circulant matrix is defined by its first row. One can define a circulant matrix
similarly using columns.
Even though a circulant matrix is a two dimensional object, in prac-
tice it behaves much like an one dimensional object given by the first row
or the first column. We will denote a circulant matrix C with first row
c0, c1, . . . , cd−1 by C = circ (c0, c1, c2, . . . , cd−1). An example of a circu-
lant 5× 5 matrix is: 

c0 c1 c2 c3 c4
c4 c0 c1 c2 c3
c3 c4 c0 c1 c2
c2 c3 c4 c0 c1
c1 c2 c3 c4 c0


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It is easy to see that all the (sub)diagonals of a circulant matrix are constant.
This fact comes in handy. Let W = circ(0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) be a d× d circulant
matrix, then clearly W d = I . We can write C = c0I+ c1W + c2W 2+ . . .+
cd−1W
d−1
. One can define a representer polynomial corresponding to the
circulant matrixC as φC = c0+c1x+c2x2+. . .+cd−1xd−1. This shows that
the circulants form a commutative ring with respect to matrix multiplication
and matrix addition and is isomorphic to (the isomorphism being matrix to
representer polynomial) F [x]
xd − 1
. For more on circulant matrices, see [1].
2.1. How easy is it to square a circulant matrix?
Let A = circ(a0, a1, . . . , ad−1) be a circulant matrix over a field of charac-
teristic 2. We show that to compute A2, we need to compute a2i for each i
in {0, 1, 2, . . . , d − 1}. Then A2 = circ
(
a2pi(0), a
2
pi(1) . . . , a
2
pi(d−1)
)
, where pi
is a permutation of 0, 1, 2, . . . , (d − 1). This was also observed by Silver-
man [8, Example 3].
Theorem 2.1. If the characteristic of the field F is 2, and d is an odd integer,
then squaring a d × d circulant matrix A is the same as squaring d field
elements.
Proof. We use the standard method of matrix multiplication; where one
computes the dot product of the ith row with the jth column for the element
at the intersection of the ith row and the jth column of the product matrix. As
we saw before the circulant matrices are closed under multiplication and a
circulant matrix is given by its first row.
Taking these into account, if the circulant is A = circ (a0, a1, . . . , ad−1),
we see that the first element of the first row of the product, is the dot product
of (a0, a1, . . . , ad−1) with the first column (a0, ad−1, . . . , a1)T . The first col-
umn can be thought of as the map ai 7→ a−i mod d for i = 0, 1, . . . , (d− 1).
For each j in {0, 1, 2, . . . , d − 1}, the map is given by ai 7→ aj−i mod d.
Now notice that if i 7→ j − i mod d, then j − i 7→ i mod d. This proves
that there are pairs formed in the dot product, which makes it zero when
working in characteristic 2.
The only thing that escapes forming pairs, are those i, for which i =
j− i mod d. Since d is odd, there is an inverse of 2 mod d and an unique
solution for i. •
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It is easy to see from the above proof, that once a d is fixed, one can easily
compute the permutation pi. The computation of d different powers can be
done in parallel.
3. THE DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM IN THE GROUP OF
NON-SINGULAR CIRCULANT MATRICES
As we saw before, circulant matrices can be represented in two different
ways – one as a circulant matrix and other as an element of the ring R =
F [x]
xd − 1
. In the later case, each element ofR is a polynomial of degree d−1
in F . The polynomial multiplication in R can be done (in parallel) using
matrix multiplication. If matrix multiplication is used to do the polynomial
multiplication, then there is no need to do the reduction mod xd − 1.
These two representations lead to two different kinds of attack to the
discrete logarithm problem:
(a) The discrete logarithm problem in matrices.
(b) The discrete logarithm problem in R.
3.1. The discrete logarithm problem in matrices. As we understood from
Menezes and Wu [5], solving the discrete logarithm problem in non-singular
matrices is tied to the largest degree of the irreducible component of the
characteristic polynomial. The best case scenario happens when the char-
acteristic polynomial is irreducible. For circulant matrices this is not the
case.
It is easy to see that the row-sum, sum of all the elements in a row, is
constant in a circulant matrix. This makes the row-sum an eigenvalue of the
matrix. Since this eigenvalue belongs to the ground field, the only way to
escape a discrete logarithm problem in the ground field is to make sure that
the eigenvalue, i.e., the row-sum, is 1. So the circulant matrix A should be
chosen with the following properties:
(ii) The matrix A has row-sum 1.
(iii) The polynomial χA
x− 1
is irreducible.
In the above case the security of the discrete logarithm problem in A is
similar to that of the discrete logarithm problem in the finite field Fqd−1 .
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3.2. The discrete logarithm problem in Fq[x]
xd − 1
. Notice that
Fq[x]
xd − 1
∼=
Fq[x]
x− 1
×
Fq[x]
ψ(x)
,
whereψ(x) = x
d − 1
x− 1
and gcd(d, q) = 1. So the discrete logarithm problem
in Fq[x]
xd − 1
reduces into two different discrete logarithm problems, one in the
field Fq and the other in the ring
Fq[x]
ψ(x)
. The matrix A can be chosen in
such a way that the representer polynomial φA(x) mod (x − 1) is either
0 or 1 and hence reveals no information about the secret key m. If ψ(x)
is irreducible, then the discrete logarithm problem is a discrete logarithm
problem in the field Fq[x]
ψ(x)
. Hence the security of the discrete logarithm
problem is the same as that of the discrete logarithm problem in Fqd−1 .
The question remains, when is ψ(x) irreducible? We know that [2, The-
orem 2.45], xd − 1 = ∏
d1|d
Φd1(x), where Φk(x) is the kth cyclotomic poly-
nomial. It follows that if d is prime, then ψ(x) = Φd(x). Then the question
reduces to, when is the dth cyclotomic polynomial irreducible, for a prime
d? It is known [2, Theorem 2.47] that the dth cyclotomic polynomial Φd(x)
is irreducible over Fq if and only if q is primitive mod d.
We summarize the requirements on A, such that the discrete logarithm
problem is as secure as the discrete logarithm problem in Fqd−1 .
(iv) The integer d is prime.
(v) The representer polynomial φA(x) mod (x− 1) is either 0 or 1.
(vi) q is primitive mod d.
4. WHY USE THE DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM WITH d× d
CIRCULANT MATRICES OVER Fq INSTEAD OF Fqd?
A quick answer to the above question is that multiplication in R, which
is isomorphic as algebra to d × d circulant matrices over Fq, can be much
faster!
In implementing the exponentiation in any group, the best known method
is the famous square-and-multiply algorithm. Using normal basis [2, Defi-
nition 2.32], in a finite field of characteristic 2, squaring is cheap; it is just
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a cyclic shift of the bits. In our case, using Theorem 2.1, it is not a cyclic
shift but a permutation. How about multiplication?
The details of the complexity of multiplication is bit involved, but well
studied. So we can skip the details here, and refer the reader to [6, 8]. The
best case complexity for multiplication in a finite field, using normal basis,
is using an optimal normal basis [6, Chapter 5]. In that case, the complexity
of multiplication in the field F2d is 2d−1 [6, Theorem 5.1]. In the case ofR,
that complexity reduces to d [8, Example 3]. In R we get security of F2d−1 .
So there is an obvious advantage of working with circulant matrices than
with finite fields – the complexity of computing the exponentiation reduces
to almost half with only one extra bit.
Lastly, one can use the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute the
inverse of a representer polynomial inR. In an ElGamal like cryptosystem,
one needs to compute that inverse. This will make decryption fast.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we study a discrete logarithm problem in the ring of circu-
lant matrices. If the matrices are of size d, then we saw that under suitable
conditions, the discrete logarithm problem is as secure as the discrete log-
arithm problem in Fqd−1 . Since multiplying circulant matrices is easier, the
discrete logarithm problem in circulant matrix is obviously better than the
discrete logarithm problem in a finite field.
There is not much history of looking at matrices for better (more secure)
discrete logarithm problem. In this note the isomorphism of the circulant
matrices with the algebra R has reduced the central issue of this work to
that of implementation of finite fields. One way to look at R, and this study
of the discrete logarithm problem in R; the finite field Fqd−1 is embedded
inR. Though this is a valid way of looking at the present situation, it is not
the whole view. For example, the issue with row-sum won’t be transparent,
unless one chooses to look at matrices. Also this opens up the possibility
that there can be other matrices, in which we can do much better with the
discrete logarithm problem.
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